Backward induction or forward reasoning? An experiment of stochastic alternating offer bargaining by Berninghaus, Siegfried et al.
Backward induction or 
forward reasoning? 
An experiment of stochastic 
alternating offer bargaining
by Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Werner Güth, 
Stephan Schosser
No. 42  |  JULY 2012
WORKING PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS
KIT – University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and
National Laboratory of the Helmholtz Association econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu
Impressum
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsforschung (IWW)
Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie und Statistik (ETS)
Schlossbezirk 12
76131 Karlsruhe
KIT – Universität des Landes Baden-Württemberg und 
nationales Forschungszentrum in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft
Working Paper Series in Economics
No. 42, July 2012
ISSN  2190-9806
econpapers.wiwi.kit.edu
Backward Induction or Forward Reasoning?
– An Experiment of Stochastic Alternating Offer
Bargaining –
Siegfried K. Berninghaus∗ Werner Gu¨th† Stephan Schosser‡
June 2012
Abstract
Bounded rationality questions backward induction, which however,
does not exclude such reasoning when anticipation is easy. In our stochas-
tic (alternating offer) bargaining experiment, there is a certain first-period
pie and a known finite deadline. What is uncertain (except for the final
period) is whether there is a further period. Whereas backward induction
requires information about all later pie sizes and probabilities, forward
reasoning is expected to consider only the immediate prospects. Rather
than relying only on decision data, we try to assess the cognitive approach
such as forward reasoning of backward induction by control of information
retrieval. We find that participants who begin with the shortest games be-
fore playing possibly longer games, initially resort to backward induction
before switching to forward-looking behavior.
Keywords: backward induction, forward reasoning, bargaining
JEL classification: C70, C72, C91
1 Introduction
In alternating offer bargaining one player, the proposer, offers a distribution of
the presently distributable pie to the other player, the responder. The responder
can then decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If the responder rejects
and the period is the terminal one, conflict results; otherwise, the next period
begins. Now both players switch roles, i.e., the proposer (responder) from the
preceding period is now responder (proposer). Usually one assumes that the
distributable pie is smaller than in the preceding period. Conflict means that
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both receive a disagreement payoff. The variant of the game lasting one period
is called ultimatum game. Longer lasting games are known as alternating offer
games (e.g., St˚ahl (1972); Rubinstein (1982)).
In alternating offer games, implausible threats allow for a wide variety of
equilibria, similar to the multiplicity of the equilibria in the ultimatum game.
However, only one such equilibrium is subgame perfect, i.e., does not rely on
implausible threats. One can derive this equilibrium by backward induction: in
the last period, the responder will accept any offer marginally above the conflict
payoff, and the proposer will offer exactly this amount. In the preceding period,
the proposer, who is the responder in the last period, will anticipate this and
offer the reduction of the pie from the second-last to the last period to the re-
sponder. Applying this principle repeatedly until the first period determines an
initial offer which the first responder should accept. In consequence, alternating
offer play last for just one period.
Sequential bargaining games are central in experimental economic research
and reveal clear differences between theoretically predicted and experimentally
observed behavior (see Gu¨th et al. (1982); Binmore et al. (1985) for early ex-
periments and Roth (1995) for a survey). Whereas the intensively studied ulti-
matum game mainly motivated the ongoing discussion of social preferences (see,
e.g., Loewenstein et al. (1989); Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels
(1998, 2000)), alternating offer bargaining games have recently not attracted as
much attention. This is surprising since alternating offer bargaining games with
shrinking pies and unique subgame perfect equilibria allow to test aspects of
bounded rationality. For only boundedly rational participants backward induc-
tion must be substituted by some form of forward thinking when the horizon
is rather long. To study when participants switch from backward induction
to forward thinking and which form of forward thinking they use, we increase
complexity by increasing the number of periods played as well as by studying
stochastic rather than deterministic alternating offer games which end with pos-
itive probability after a non-terminal period without agreement. Let us review
the main former studies before arguing how such a design may help to study
such topics experimentally.
Binmore et al. (1985) conducted an alternating offer experiment lasting for
two periods which was repeated once. Although initial offers in the first play
were close to half of the first pie size, they observed a clear shift toward backward
induction play in the repetition and concluded that learning results in offers
closer to the theoretical benchmark by backward induction.
In response to Binmore et al. (1985), Gu¨th and Tietz (1986) find that par-
ticipants do not play the backward induction solution, if the backward induction
outcome is unfair.
Neelin et al. (1988) reacted to Binmore et al. (1985) by another set of exper-
iments, varying both the duration and the pie sizes. They found that behavior is
neither in line with fairness nor with backward induction. In their experiments,
the modal initial offer is the pie size distributable in the second period.1
1Binmore et al. (1988) replied to Neelin et al. (1988).
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Ochs and Roth (1989) find that a substantial percentage of first offers is
rejected and that several of these rejections were followed by disadvantageous
counterproposals. They confirmed that first-period offers lie between the theo-
retical benchmark and equal division of first-period pies. Binmore et al. (2002)
explore experimentally a two-period alternating offer game as well as its sub-
games and find that the behavior violates both subgame and truncation consis-
tency.2
Finally, Johnson et al. (2002) try to separate the impact of three different
decision rules in a three-period alternating offer game: (1) instantly offering
40% of the pie; (2) assuming that the responder in period 1 will offer 50% of
the remaining pie in period 2 and reason back (Stahl and Haruvy (2003)); (3)
backward induction. To observe all different “cognitive styles,” they monitor
when and which information is retrieved throughout the game. They confirm (1)
and question backward induction (3) by not observing its necessary information
retrieval. In an additional treatment, they let participants interact with robots,
playing according to the backward induction solution and observe that this leads
to backward induction play.
To sum up, the results are partly contradictory. A convincing and consis-
tent explanation of observed behavior is still missing. But, of course, there may
be heterogeneity in playing such games. By monitoring information retrieval,
Johnson et al. (2002) demonstrated different attitudes in the same experiment.
This heterogeneity could partly result from differences in mental abilities. To
explore this in our experiment, participants successively play four different al-
ternating offer games with an increasing number of periods, starting with a
two-period game and ending with a five-period game. In this way, we hope to
identify individual switching from backward induction to forward reasoning. To
vary the difficulty of backward induction, we employ stochastic alternating offer
games, i.e., after each non-terminal period without an agreement a random draw
determines whether the game continues or conflict results. To access the cogni-
tive styles, participants decide before the first offer which information they want
to use during play. This information, for which the participants have to pay,
is available throughout the experiment, hopefully revealing what participants
react to.
Independent of the length of the stochastic alternating offer game, about a
third of all participants resorts to equal splits. Of the remaining participants
most rely on backward induction when it is socially acceptable and the game
is limited to two periods. They switch to forward-looking behavior when the
game lasts for up to three periods. In even longer games, participants resort to
equal splits without considering end play behavior.
In section 2, we formally introduce the stochastic alternating offer games.
Section 3 describes the experimental protocol. We introduce different reasoning
modes from literature in section 4. After describing and analyzing the data
statistically in section 5 we conclude in section 6 where we link our main findings
2Subgame consistency means that subgame play is independent of how the subgame is
embedded in the larger game context. Truncation consistency means that play does not
change when a subgame is substituted by its solution payoffs (see Selten and Gu¨th (1982)).
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to the related literature.
2 Stochastic Alternating Offer Games
with Information Retrieval
Without loss of generality, the initial pie Π1 is set equal to 100. We assume that
Π1 is available with certainty but not the later pies Πt for t > 1. The class G of
stochastic alternating offer games G is defined by
G = (T, (Πt, pt)1<t≤T ), with 2 ≤ T <∞
where T ≥ 2 is the maximum number of periods with alternating offers. The
continuation probability pt ∈ (0, 1) specifies how likely it is that, in case of not
reaching an earlier agreement, in later periods t with 1 < t ≤ T the amount Πt,
the pie Πt in period t, can be distributed. With probability (1 − pt) nothing
is available in period t, meaning that bargaining ends in period t − 1 without
an agreement. Here we restrict attention to shrinking pies3 in the sense of
Πt > Πt+1 for all 1 ≤ t < T .
In odd (even) t, player 1 (2) proposes the share Ot ∈ [0,Πt] of the pie Πt,
offered to the other player, who then decides whether to accept or refuse. If
she accepts, bargaining ends with the responder earning Ot and the proposer
collecting the residual Πt − Ot. If she refuses, she has to make a counteroffer
in the following period t + 1, provided that t + 1 ≤ T and that chance allows
distributing Πt+1. Otherwise, the game ends in conflict with conflict payoffs of
0 for both.
Players can voluntarily retrieve information before the first period t = 1. At
this time, players 1 and 2 know only Π1 = 100 and T but not yet Πt and pt
for t = 2, ..., T where the pie sizes Πt are not equidistant and the probabilities
pt not constant. For each information, i.e., each information request for Πt or
pt, the player faces costs of 1, which are subtracted from her earnings. Once
an information has been retrieved, it remains available for the whole play4 with
at most T alternating offer periods. Players decide initially which information
they want to buy. Whereas they can completely neglect probability information,
they must buy information about Πt when period t is actually reached to state
an offer Ot in the range [0; Πt]. Of course, players can buy this information
already before the first period. We intentionally limit all voluntary information
requests to the time before t = 1 to simplify the classification of cognitive styles.
The minor fee (of one token) for each piece of information is mainly imposed
to limit information retrieval for the sake of curiosity, which may be especially
strong since we do not provide full information after playing. Of course, curiosity
may be still strong enough to accept the minor information costs, but at least in
3In stochastic alternating offer games even increasing pie sizes may render later agreements
less efficient when efficiency is measured by expected payoffs.
4Here we deviate from Johnson et al. (2002) who control for how often, how long, and in
which sequence a certain information is looked up and who provide information at no cost.
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later plays, we expect participants to retrieve only information which, according
to their cognitive style, they deem necessary.
Period T2 T3 T4 T5
1 Π1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2 p2,Π2 0.6, 60.0 0.4, 84.0 0.6, 61.0 0.5, 72.0
3 p3,Π3 -, - 0.6, 40.0 0.7, 36.0 0.6, 42.5
4 p4,Π4 -, - -, - 0.3, 20.0 0.5, 29.0
5 p5,Π5 -, - -, - -, - 0.7, 20.0
Table 1: Games used in the experiment
In Table 1 we summarize the games used in our experiment, all of which let
the pie Πt shrink irregularly and probability pt vary across 2 ≤ t ≤ T to render
information retrieval worthwhile.
3 Experimental Protocol
We conducted the experiment in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck
Institute in Jena5 with 248 participants. When recruiting, we ensured that none
of them had previously participated in any ultimatum or bargaining experiment.
In each of our 8 sessions, we randomly paired participants and assigned 8
participants to one matching group (7 sessions with 4 matching groups, one
with 3 matching groups). All participants faced a different participant in each
game, changing their role after each game, e.g., participants who were player
1 in the first (and third) game were player 2 in second (and last) game. Each
participant played all four bargaining games (see Table 1), starting with shortest
horizon (T = 2) and increasing the planning horizon after each game. Since
each matching group generated one independent result, we obtained altogether
31 independent (matching group) observations.
Participants received a hard copy of the instructions, which were read aloud
to make them common knowledge. Then participants played the games using a
computer terminal.
After participants had played all four games, we paid them in private. All
participants received a show up fee of e2.50 and an additional e0.50 to compen-
sate potential losses when buying information and not reaching an agreement.
For each point a participant earned, he received e0.05. Participants earned
e11.27 on average (minimum: e3.00, maximum: e15.90). A session lasted ap-
proximately 1 hour, including 15 minutes each for reading the instructions and
paying participants.
4 Reasoning Modes
Let us describe the main reasoning modes, as suggested by the data of earlier
experiments as well as our own experiment, whose various predictions will be
5For all methodological and technical details and the instructions, see Appendix B
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tested both by the negotiation data and the information requests.
4.1 Backward induction
To calculate the backward induction solution (based on opportunism6) for a
stochastic alternating offer game, assume that the proposer in the last-period
offers 0 to the responder. For the game lasting 5 periods (see column “T5” in
Table 2) this implies for t = 5 the offer O∗5 = 0. In t = 4, the proposer knows
that her fellow player will allot the whole pie Π5 to herself and therefore offer
her Π5 discounted by the continuation probability p5, i.e. O∗4 = p5 · Π5. The
proposer in t = 3 will anticipate this and offer the difference Π4−O∗4 discounted
by p4 to her fellow player. This form of backward reasoning continues until the
proposer in t = 1 derives O∗1 . The solution play is that player 1 offers O∗1 ,
which is then accepted by player 2, the responder in period t = 1. Thus – which
is typical of alternating offer bargaining with shrinking pies – parties do not
alternate in offering agreements but agree immediately and hence efficiently.
Obviously, a player resorting to backward induction needs to know all con-
tinuation probabilities and all pie sizes. Table 2 summarizes the backward
induction offers for all games in Table 1. We designed the games such that the
backward induction offer O∗1 was / would be around 25.0 for all experiments.
The exception is T2 where O∗1 is slightly higher.7
Period T2 T3 T4 T5
1 O∗1 0.6 · 60.0 0.4 · (84.0− 24.0) 0.6 · (61.0− 21.0) 0.5 · (72.0− 21.0)
= 36.0 = 24.0 = 24.0 = 25.5
2 O∗2 0.6 · 40.0 0.7 · (36.0− 6.0) 0.6 · (42.5− 7.5)
= 0.0 = 24.0 = 21.0 = 21.0
3 O∗3 0.3 · 20.0 0.5 · (29.0− 14.0)
- = 0.0 = 6.0 = 7.5
4 O∗4 0.7 · 20.0
- - = 0.0 = 14.0
5 O∗5 - - - = 0.0
Table 2: Backward induction offers O∗t for the games in Table 1
4.2 Equal split
Since former studies of alternating offer bargaining found evidence for equal
split offers (see, e.g., Binmore et al. (1985)), we also expect equal split offers in
t = 1, i.e., O1 = 0.5 ·Π1 = 50.0. A player making an equal split offer would not
need any additional information and could therefore refrain from buying any
information.
6Each player is opportunistic in the sense of maximizing her own monetary payoff expec-
tation, which is commonly known. Common knowledge can obviously be weakened since it
depends on T how often one has to assume that players know that players know... that both
players are opportunistic in this sense.
7In a game lasting at most two periods, either p2 or Π2 would need to be very low to reach
such a value.
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4.3 (Expectation based) forward reasoning
Several forward reasoning patterns are possible and partly supported by evi-
dence of former experiments. We give an overview of these patterns and name
for easy reference later.
Offer (p2)Π2: Neelin et al. (1988) observe that most proposers (independent
of the duration of the game) offer the second-period pie O1 = Π2 to the first
responder, which player 2, the first responder, accepts. In our games, this
corresponds to O1 ≥ p2Π2, where we assume that O1 is not less than half of
the first-period pie.8 A player offering the second-period pie would only be
interested in Π2. In our experiments, the second-period pie is always above half
the size of the first-period pie, i.e., Π2 > Π1/2 holds. Hence, we do not expect
to see many participants resorting to this pattern. For O1 = p2Π2 one would,
of course, have to know both p2 and Π2.
Offer (p2)Π2/2: Johnson et al. (2002) claim that some proposers in the first
period expect the responder to offer them half of the second-period pie. By
reasoning back, the proposer keeps not only the difference between the first and
the second pie for herself, but also half of the second pie. Hence, her offer is
only O1 = Π2/2 respectively O1 = p2Π2/2.
Of course, forward thinking as illustrated by cognitive styles “Offer Π2” and
“Offer Π2/2” may be questioned by strategic reasoning. Player 1, for instance,
could gain by informing herself about Π3 and applying her reasoning also to the
behavior of player 2. In consequence, she would ask for an even larger fraction
of the pie in the first period. The longer a player looks ahead, the lower the offer
she will have to make to her fellow player, but the more complex the decision
problem will turn out to be. Hence, we expect cognitive styles will involve more
periods being employed less often.
4.4 Socially acceptable forward reasoning
According to Ochs and Roth (1989), participants perceive offers below a certain
threshold as “insultingly low” and reject them. We see similar rejection rates in
our experiment (for details see Section 5). If we interpret the alternating offer
game as a lottery [pr(O1),O1; 1−pr(O1), 0] with pr(O1) as the rejection proba-
bility for offer O1, unfair offers yield low expected payoffs (see Fig. 1 visualizing
the expected payoffs).9 Interestingly, the expected payoff of the first proposer
decreases the lower the first period offer. Only in two cases does this payoff lie
above 50 (in games T2 and T4 for offers in the range [45;50[).
8In the deterministic alternating offer games, this would require Π2 ≤ Π1/2. Only for such
games were offers O1 = Π2 observed by Neelin et al. (1988) and Gu¨th and Tietz (1986); i.e.,
first proposers hardly ever offered more than Π1/2 to the responder even when Π2 > Π1/2.
9To derive probabilities even for less frequent offers, we grouped all offers. The expected
payoff is the minimum offer in the group multiplied with the rejection probability in the group.
This means the values represent the maximum payoff the first period proposer could expect
in the group.
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Result 1: First-period offers below 45 do not pay.
Figure 1: Expected payoff vs. first-period offer
Notice that Figure 1 assumes that all participants correctly anticipate rejec-
tion probabilities. In all four games, expected payoffs drop below 40 for offers
around 35. In addition, across all games offers between 35 and 40 are rejected
with a probability of 50%. Hence, we expect participants to make offers of 35
and higher. Participants resorting to this strategy gather only as much infor-
mation as they need to justify that offers O1) ≥ 35 are reasonable.
For the “cognitive styles” Table 3 presents the initial offers O1 suggested by
the former (with highest offers displayed first). The games were designed in a
way that first-period offers differ as much as possible.
Cognitive Style T2 T3 T4 T5
Offer Π2 60.0 84.0 61.0 72.0
Equal split 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Socially acceptable 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
Offer Π2/2 30.0 42.0 30.5 36.0
Offer p2Π2 36.0 33.6 36.6 36.0
Backward induction 36.0 24.0 24.0 25.5
Offer p2Π2/2 18.0 16.8 18.3 18.0
Table 3: Predicted first offers (O1) for games from Table 1 according to different
cognitive styles
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5 Analysis of Negotiation Data
Table 4 summarizes medians MD, means M, and standard deviation SD of the
first-period offers for all four games (see Table 13 in Appendix A for matching
group averages). When comparing these values to our predictions in Table 3,
we see that neither
T2 T3 T4 T5
MD 41.0 45.0 43.0 45.0
M (SD) 44.2 (14.4) 45.0 (11.8) 43.3 (8.7) 44.8 (9.9)
Table 4: Average offers per experiment
of the values is close to any benchmark solution. “Equal Split” and “Offer p2Π2”
come closest but are still far away. Similar to Johnson et al. (2002), we assume
heterogeneity of cognitive styles, which is confirmed when investigating the dis-
tribution of offers (see Table 5). About 30% of all participants play exactly the
equal split solution, another 30% make an offer between 40 and 45. Offers in
other value ranges are less frequent.
Result 2: Median and mean offers are rather fair and normally deviate con-
siderably from O∗1 , what is partly justified by the response behavior in the first
period with first-period responders often rejecting O1 ≤ 40.
Offer T2 T3 T4 T5
# Accepted # Accepted # Accepted # Accepted
[0; 20[ 5 0.0% 3 0.0% 1 0.0% - -
[20; 25[ 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0%
[25; 30[ 2 50.0% 2 0.0% 2 50.0% - -
[30; 35[ 11 54.5% 5 60.0% 9 33.3% 7 28.6%
[35; 40[ 4 50.0% 11 36.4% 13 53.8% 9 66.7%
[40; 45[ 39 71.8% 30 70.0% 40 72.5% 33 78.8%
[45; 50[ 10 100.0% 19 89.5% 21 95.2% 30 90.0%
[50] 38 100.0% 43 100.0% 31 100.0% 35 100.0%
]50; 100] 12 100.0% 10 100.0% 6 100.0% 7 100.0%
All 78.2% 79.0% 78.2% 83.1%
Table 5: Frequency of acceptance of offers in first period
In the first period, 50% of the offers in the interval 35 ≤ O1 < 40 are rejected,
and there is a 25% rejection rate for offers between 40 and 45, illustrating
that participants are pursuing fairness. For games T3, T4, and T5 “Backward
Induction” would therefore have led to no agreement in the first period with 50%
probability. Most of the forward-looking cognitive styles would also confront the
first proposer with a high risk of rejection. Although due to p2 between 0.4 and
0.6 termination of the game after period 1 is likely, participants risk conflict
when they deem first offers unacceptable.
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Period T2 T3 T4 T5
# “Irrational” # “Irrational” # “Irrational” # “Irrational”
2 12 33.3% 11 0.0% 17 47.1% 10 30.0%
3 - - 0 - 4 75.0% 3 33.3%
4 - - - - 1 0.0% 0 -
5 - - - - 0 -
All 12 33.3% 11 0.0% 22 50.0% 13 30.8%
Table 6: Numbers of counteroffers and fractions of “Irrational” counteroffers
which would yield less than earlier acceptance, given their acceptance.
Across all games about a third of all counteroffers (see Table 6) assign to the
second proposer less than what he would have received by accepting, i.e., a third
of all counteroffers are “irrational,” a fact especially observed and discussed by
Ochs and Roth (1989). This is in line with the evidence of costly punishment
(e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000)), showing that when observing unfair and there-
fore unacceptable outcomes, participants do not mind to sacrifice own payoff in
order to discipline others.
5.1 Information acquisition
Let us now focus on voluntary information retrieval before the first period. The
information acquired by player 1 and player 2 is quite similar (see Table 7).10
A test comparing the number of informations requests by player 1 and player
2 reveals significant differences.11 About 32% of all participants do not buy
any information and about 10% of all participants show unusual information
requests by restricting interest to pie sizes or continuation probabilities of inter-
mediate periods.12 Since these retrieval patterns are infrequent and not in line
with any of the cognitive syles discussed above, we neglect them.
Result 3: First-period proposers and responders reveal similar patterns of in-
formation retrieval; about one third of all participants does not invest at all in
information, whereas those investing in information vary in what they retrieve.
10This table can be read as follows: The columns represent experiments and players, while
each row stands for a certain information pattern. Line t = 2, e.g., stands for participants
gathering information about period 2 (only), lines t ∈ [2, 3] stand for participants gathering
information about periods 2 and 3, ... Πt indicates that participants are only interested in pie
sizes, pt stands for participants interested in probabilities only, ... To give an example, the
value 3.2% in column “T4, Pl. 2” and row “t ∈ [2, 3], Πt, pt” implies that 3.2% of all players 2
in game T4 retrieved information about all pie sizes and continuation probabilities of periods
2 and 3 and no other information, meaning they informed themselves about Π2, Π3, p2, and
p3.
11Comparison of the fraction of proposers vs. the fraction of responders buying no infor-
mation per group (31 independent observations, Wilcoxon Test): T = 2: Z=-0.628, p=0.530;
T = 3: Z=-1.404, p=0.160; T = 4: Z=-1.386, p=0.166; T = 5: Z=-0.951, p=0.342.
12Such patterns occurred at most five times or less often. The only exception is the pattern
in which participants bought information concerning the pie size in periods 2 and 3 plus the
continuation probability in period 2 (T = 3: 13 cases, T = 4: 10 cases, and T = 5: 14 cases).
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T2 T3 T4 T5
Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 Pl. 2
t = 2 Πt 24.2% 18.5% 8.9% 14.5% 19.4% 16.1% 12.9% 17.7%
pt 16.9% 18.5% 9.7% 8.9% 7.3% 10.5% 10.5% 10.5%
Πt, pt 21.0% 29.8% 15.3% 8.9% 14.5% 11.3% 14.5% 9.7%
Sum 62.1% 66.9% 33.9% 32.3% 41.1% 37.9% 37.9% 37.9%
t ∈ Πt - - 14.5% 16.1% 5.6% 8.9% 5.6% 4.8%
[2, 3] pt - - 4.8% 4.0% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.8%
Πt, pt - - 12.1% 2.4% 1.6% 3.2% 4.0% 3.2%
Sum - - 31.5% 22.6% 8.9% 13.7% 9.7% 8.9%
t ∈ Πt - - - - 4.8% 5.6% 0.8% 0.0%
[2..4] pt - - - - 2.4% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Πt, pt - - - - 0.0% 3.2% 0.8% 0.0%
Sum - - - - 7.3% 9.7% 1.6% 0.0%
t ∈ Πt - - - - - - 1.6% 0.0%
[2..5] pt - - - - - - 0.0% 0.0%
Πt, pt - - - - - - 0.8% 0.0%
Sum - - - - - - 2.4% 0.0%
No info. 37.9% 33.1% 24.2% 33.1% 29.8% 22.6% 33.9% 37.9%
Other - - 10.5% 12.1% 12.9% 16.1% 14.5% 15.3%
Table 7: Frequency of information acquisition per experiment
Other information acquisition patterns allow for backward induction by ac-
quiring information for period 2 (t = 2), for periods 2 and 3 (t ∈ [2, 3]), for
periods 2 to 4 (t ∈ [2, 3, 4]) or for periods 2 to 5 (t ∈ [2, 3, 4, 5]). Participants
are interested in both, pie sizes and continuation probabilities (Πt, pt, about
20%), or in pie sizes only (Πt: about 25%). About 14% of all participants are
interested in the continuation probabilities only (pt: 14%) and thus reveal a
surprising curiosity.
While in game T3 equally many participants are interested in all periods,
interest in later periods decreases for the longer games (T4, T5). In game T5,
only 2.4% are interested in the last period (t = T = 5). Hence, we conclude
that participants rely on forward reasoning and neglect later periods.
Result 4: When the horizon is long as, for example, in game T5, information
retrieval, as required by backward induction, is rare.
T2 T3 T4 T5
Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Pl. 1 Pl. 2
Πt 1.00 1.00 1.62 1.53 1.51 1.66 1.58 1.21
pt 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.31 1.57 1.25 1.00 1.07
Πt, pt 2.00 2.00 2.88 2.43 2.20 3.09 2.80 2.50
No info. - - - - - - - -
Other - - 2.46 2.40 2.63 2.70 2.44 2.89
All 1.34 1.45 2.14 1.80 1.88 2.14 2.05 1.87
Table 8: Information costs per participant
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Table 8 gives an overview of average information costs. While in games T2
and T3 no significant difference between information costs per participant exists,
in games T4 (T5) information costs of player 1 are significantly lower (higher)
than the costs of player 2.13
6 Reasoning Styles
Are the offers in line with the cognitive styles discussed above? We focus on
the offers in the first period (see Table 9) and first refer to the participants
with an “Equal Split” strategy who should not be interested in any information
and offer 50% of the initial pie (Π1). In all four games about 40 participants
bought no information, i.e., were potential equal splitters and made offers with
a median of 50 (only game T5 deviates with a median of 48). The individual
offers of participants buying no information also show that more than 50% of
them offered around 50 in the first period (see Tables 10-15). The “equal split”
mode of reasoning is the reasoning style of about 34% of all participants.
Result 5: Equal splitters are quite frequent and develop this tendency without
any attempt to explore what they could gain by behaving strategically.
Participants playing backward induction have to buy information concerning
the pie size Πt and the continuation probability pt for all periods of the game. In
games T4 and T5, less than 1% of all players 1 buy this information (see Table 7).
In games T2 and T3, more than 20% and 10%, respectively, buy this informa-
tion. When comparing first-period offers of participants buying and not buying
all information, those not buying resort to equal split offers significantly more
frequently in game T2.14 In addition, the average first-period offer of player 1
participants in T2 buying Π2, p2-information is, with 38.81, (see Table 9) close
to the theoretical prediction by backward induction. For game T3 we do not
find a significant difference in offers15 between those participants retrieving no
information and those retrieving all information for backward induction. We
conclude that about 20% of participants in game T2 resort to backward induc-
tion, while we do not find such behavior in any longer game.
Result 6: In line with earlier results (e.g., of Binmore et al. (1985)), in game T2
only a significant share of participants behaves according to backward induction
by both information retrieval and first-period offer close to its prediction.
Even so, participants interested in both continuation probabilities pt and pie
sizes Πt of games T4 and T3 often choose the equal split in the first period.16
13Comparison of information costs of first proposers vs responders per group (31 indepen-
dent observations, Wilcoxon Test): T = 2: Z=-1.427, p=0.154; T = 3: Z=-2.529, p=0.011;
T = 4: Z=-2.028, p=0.043; T = 5: Z=-1.320, p=0.187.
14Wilcoxon Test: Obs. 18, Z=-2.588, p=0.010.
15Wilcoxon Test: Obs. 10, Z=-1.612, p=0.107.
16Wilcoxon Test: T4: Obs. 11, Z=-1.782, p=0.075; T5: Obs. 17, Z=-1.301, p=0.193.
12
T2 T3 T4 T5
Π MD (#) 40.00 (30) 46.00 (29) 40.00 (37) 40.50 (26)
M (SD) 42.33 (19.3) 47.45 (18.1) 40.13 (6.7) 42.04 (7.7)
p MD (#) 40.00 (21) 45.00 (13) 42.00 (14) 45.00 (13)
M (SD) 42.52 (8.5) 46.28 (9.6) 44.29 (4.8) 44.08 (5.6)
Π, p MD (#) 40.00 (26) 40.00 (25) 41.00 (20) 44.00 (25)
M (SD) 38.81 (13.6) 41.56 (11.0) 41.55 (5.6) 42.36 (7.3)
No info. MD (#) 50.00 (47) 50.00 (42) 50.00 (37) 48.00 (42)
M (SD) 48.21 (12.2) 46.27 (5.4) 49.62 (9.0) 47.33 (10.8)
Other MD (#) - (-) 45.00 (18) 40.00 (16) 45.00 (18)
M (SD) - (-) 44.00 (8.1) 37.13 (9.8) 46.81 (14.5)
Table 9: Offers per information pattern
Hence, we attribute their interest in information to curiosity and not to cognitive
styles such as “Offer p2Π2” and “Offer p2Π2/2.”
Finally, we investigate cognitive styles based on pie sizes only, namely “Offer
Π2” and “Offer Π2/2” by player 1. As expected (see the evidence of Neelin et al.
(1988) and Gu¨th and Tietz (1986)), “Offer Π2” has little chance when suggest-
ing O1 > Π1/2 (see Tables 10-15: T2: 13.3%, T3: 13.3%, T4: 0.0%, and T2:
3.8%). Cognitive style “Offer Π2/2,” on the other hand, seems to occur fre-
quently in our experiments. In games T4 and T5, the offers by players 1 with
information about pie sizes are significantly lower than offers of participants
retrieving no information.17 In games T2 and T3, we find no such effect, and
the offers of these participants (see Tables 10-15) are in line with the theoretical
prediction: about 20% of participants in game T2 and T3 resort to “Offer Π2/2”
in a forward reasoning style based on pie information only.
6.1 Discussion
To summarize our results and relate them to the cognitive styles, we crosstable
for each game in Table 3 the first-period offers and the information patterns
(see Tables 10 to 15).
In game T2 (see Table 10), 38% of all participants (compared to 32% in all
games) buy no information, with the majority of them (30 out 47) offering 45 or
more. We classify these participants as equal splitters. Another group of 13
participants buys no information and offers 40 to 45, apparently entertaining the
idea of a “first mover advantage.” Information of only Πt or pt leads to no
clear deviation from the behavior of those without any information. Participants
knowing both Πt and pt seem to rely on “Offer p2Π2” (offerO∞ = 36.0), whereas
offers below 35 support neither “Offer p2Π2/2” nor “Offer Π2/2”.
Behavioral patterns remain similar in games lasting for three periods (T3, see
Table 11). Although fewer participants buy no information, i.e., 30 compared
to 47 in game T2, first-period offers reveal the same peaks (around 50 and in the
17Wilcoxon-Test: T2: Obs. 17, Z=-0.853, p=0.394; T3: Obs. 12, Z=-1.479, p=0.139; T4:
Obs. 16, Z=-2.735, p=0.006; T5: Obs. 16, Z=-2.324, p=0.020.
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No Info. Πt pt Πt, pt Other All
[0; 20[ - 2 1 2 - 5
[20; 25[ - 2 - 1 - 3
[25; 30[ 1 1 - - - 2
[30; 35[ 2 4 1 4 - 11
[35; 40[ 1 1 1 1 - 4
[40; 45[ 13 7 8 11 - 39
[45; 50[ 2 4 2 2 - 10
[50] 21 5 8 4 - 38
]50; 100] 7 4 - 1 - 12
All 47 30 21 26 0
Table 10: Information patterns vs. first-period offers for T2
No Info. Πt pt Πt, pt Other All
[0; 20[ - 2 - 1 - 3
[20; 25[ - - - 1 - 1
[25; 30[ - - - 1 1 2
[30; 35[ 1 - 1 2 1 5
[35; 40[ 1 2 1 7 - 11
[40; 45[ 7 9 5 7 2 30
[45; 50[ 4 4 4 4 3 19
[50] 16 8 5 8 6 43
]50; 100] 1 4 2 3 - 10
All 30 29 18 34 13
Table 11: Information patterns vs. first-period offers for T3
range of 40 to 45) and a similar distribution, supporting equal split strategies.
For all other information patterns, i.e., Πt, pt or (Πt, pt), the distribution of
the first-period offers is similar to those participants without any information.
Altogether in game T3 no cognitive style other than equal splitting is observable:
only 9% of offers are below 35 suggesting that neither backward induction nor
“Offer p2Π2/2” play a major role.
In games T4 and T5 (see Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix A), participants
buying no information have a stronger tendency to split equally than in shorter
games.
Depending on the game, median offers were either close to a fair distribution
or supported the backward induction solution (see Table 12 for an overview).
Nevertheless, for both the fair or the rational benchmark contradicting evidence
exists. Furthermore, information retrieval allows us to distinguish different cog-
nitive styles.
Fairness, backward induction, and forward reasoning all occur, but their
influence depends on the time horizon. Some participants are fair, i.e., they
offer about half of the initial pie, and are not interested in later periods of the
bargaining process. Their overall share is about a third and does not change
across games. The remaining two thirds of participants resort to other cognitive
styles, variants of forward-looking cognitive styles, or backward induction.
We found evidence for changes in cognitive styles being related to the com-
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M of O1 Amnt. Π2 Π3 Π4 Π5
Binmore et al. (1985)* 50.0% (25.0%) £1.00 25.0 - - -
Neelin et al. (1988) 25.0%-30.0% $5.00 25.0 - - -
50.0% $5.00 50.0 25.0 - -
34.0% $5.00 34.0 11.6 4.0 1.4
34.3%-36.6% $15.00 25.0 - - -
34.0% $15.00 50.0 25.0 - -
34.0% $15.00 34.0 11.6 4.0 1.4
Ochs and Roth (1989)** 40.0% $30.00 40.0 - - -
41.0%-45.0% $30.00 40.0 16.0 - -
46.0%-49.0% $30.00 60.0 - - -
41.0%-45.0% $30.00 60.0 36.0 - -
Johnson et al. (2002) 40.0%-44.0% $5.00 50.0 25.0 - -
Our results 41.0% e5.00 60.0 - - -
45.0% e5.00 84.0 40.0 - -
43.0% e5.00 61.0 36.0 20.0 -
45.0% e5.00 72.0 42.5 29.0 20.0
* The game was played twice. In the second play only player 2 from the first
repetition made an offer. The median of the second repetition is shown in brackets.
** The games vary only with respect to Πt. Here, we focus on the symmetric
version only.
Table 12: Median first-period offers in experiments (Π1 normalized to 100)
plexity of the game (in game T3 twice as many offers are near the backward
induction solution compared to game T5 (T4)). Some form of level-n bounded
rationality (Stahl and Haruvy (2003)), as observed by Johnson et al. (2002), is
not supported (all offers are just too high).
On the other hand, the conclusion of Ochs and Roth (1989) that participants
perceive offers below a certain threshold as “insultingly low” and reject them
is justified. In our experiments, participants rejected about 20% of all offers,18
which is comparable to related experiments (Johnson et al. (2002)); especially
low offers face a high risk of being rejected, which participants seem to antici-
pate. When backward reasoning based on the retrieved information suggests an
unfair offer, participants seem to stop using such information and rather resort
to a fair offer. Offers differ between participants retrieving no information and
all other participants19 (with the exception of T3, suggesting that allowing and
monitoring voluntary information retrieval is a promising research method).
18T2: 21.8%; T3: 21.0%; T4: 21.8%; T5: 16.9%.
19Wilcoxon Test: T2: Obs. 26, Z=-2.707, p=0.007; T3: Obs. 20, Z=-1.457, p=0.145; T4:
Obs. 24, Z=-3.687, p=0.000; T5: Obs. 27, Z=-2.596, p=0.009.
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A Supplementary data
This appendix gathers supplementary data which might be of interest to the
reader but is to extensive for the main paper.
Table 13 summarizes aggregates for all matching groups, i.e., all independent
observations. Column ‘MD’ is the median first-period offer in the matching
group, ‘M’ the mean, and ‘SD’ the standard deviation.
Gr. T2 T3 T4 T5
MD M (SD) MD M (SD) MD M (SD) MD M(SD)
1 40.0 38.0 (14.2) 75.0 71.5 (33.4) 41.5 43.0 (5.0) 75.0 70.5 (34.9)
2 44.5 42.3 (9.3) 40.0 42.5 (5.0) 42.5 41.0 (5.2) 45.0 44.5 (3.3)
3 40.0 38.8 (6.3) 40.0 38.8 (6.3) 37.5 37.5 (2.9) 37.5 38.5 (4.4)
4 45.0 45.0 (20.4) 46.5 39.5 (16.7) 41.0 44.5 (10.6) 33.5 34.3 (15.5)
5 40.0 42.5 (5.0) 42.5 42.8 (4.6) 44.5 44.8 (5.5) 45.0 45.0 (4.1)
6 50.0 48.0 (5.4) 47.5 46.3 (4.8) 50.0 47.8 (5.2) 47.5 46.3 (4.8)
7 45.0 43.8 (7.5) 47.5 44.3 (8.5) 33.0 35.3 (12.0) 47.5 41.8 (13.4)
8 45.0 42.5 (9.6) 44.0 44.5 (5.3) 40.0 40.0 (9.5) 44.0 44.5 (5.3)
9 45.0 42.5 (9.6) 37.5 38.8 (8.5) 45.0 41.3 (7.5) 40.5 40.0 (8.6)
10 42.5 37.5 (15.6) 50.0 48.8 (2.5) 44.0 44.5 (4.2) 47.5 46.3 (4.8)
11 42.5 37.5 (19.4) 50.0 50.3 (2.1) 46.0 46.8 (6.2) 46.0 45.8 (4.0)
12 45.0 46.3 (11.1) 45.0 43.8 (7.5) 42.5 43.0 (3.6) 45.0 42.8 (9.8)
13 41.0 48.0 (14.7) 52.5 53.0 (12.6) 38.5 38.0 (6.3) 41.5 39.5 (6.7)
14 45.0 50.0 (17.8) 50.0 46.3 (7.5) 50.0 47.0 (6.0) 50.0 47.5 (5.0)
15 40.0 38.8 (6.3) 45.0 46.3 (2.5) 45.0 44.5 (4.9) 45.0 45.5 (3.3)
16 46.0 50.5 (13.7) 42.5 41.3 (8.5) 38.0 42.8 (15.4) 44.5 43.5 (2.4)
17 50.0 47.5 (5.0) 50.0 47.5 (5.0) 45.0 45.0 (5.8) 47.5 47.6 (10.2)
18 40.0 39.5 (7.4) 43.0 46.5 (13.1) 33.5 35.3 (6.7) 41.5 41.3 (6.4)
19 40.0 37.5 (12.6) 35.0 35.0 (9.1) 50.0 47.5 (5.0) 40.0 39.3 (7.0)
20 47.5 55.0 (16.8) 50.0 50.0 (0.0) 49.5 51.0 (6.4) 50.0 51.3 (2.5)
21 40.0 33.8 (19.7) 44.0 37.0 (18.9) 50.0 46.3 (7.5) 47.5 45.0 (7.1)
22 50.0 47.5 (5.0) 50.0 50.5 (7.4) 50.0 48.0 (4.0) 50.0 47.5 (5.0)
23 50.0 47.0 (6.0) 50.0 51.3 (10.3) 46.5 45.8 (5.1) 50.0 48.0 (4.0)
24 32.5 33.8 (13.8) 42.5 35.0 (16.8) 38.5 38.0 (6.2) 44.5 44.5 (3.7)
25 40.0 40.0 (8.2) 40.0 38.8 (10.3) 42.5 43.8 (4.8) 42.5 43.8 (4.8)
26 47.5 46.3 (4.8) 39.5 41.0 (6.4) 44.5 44.8 (4.1) 44.0 43.3 (7.0)
27 47.5 58.8 (27.8) 45.0 44.3 (6.8) 41.0 42.8 (5.0) 45.5 44.3 (7.0)
28 40.0 47.5 (37.8) 45.0 46.3 (7.5) 40.0 32.3 (15.5) 42.5 44.0 (5.2)
29 50.0 55.0 (25.2) 49.5 49.3 (1.0) 46.5 52.0 (27.5) 49.0 48.3 (2.4)
30 35.0 33.8 (14.9) 38.0 34.0 (9.5) 42.5 43.8 (4.8) 40.0 37.5 (5.0)
31 45.0 45.0 (5.8) 47.0 51.0 (13.3) 43.0 44.0 (4.3) 47.0 47.5 (10.1)
All 41.0 44.2 (14.4) 45.0 45.0 (11.8) 43.0 43.3 (8.7) 45.0 44.8 (9.9)
Table 13: Offers in first period
Tables 14 and 15 offer the same analyses for game T4, and T5, respectively,
as Tables 10 and 11 in the main paper do for the games T2 and T3.
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No Info. Πt pt Πt, pt Other All
[0; 20[ - - - - 1 1
[20; 25[ - 1 - - - 1
[25; 30[ - 1 - - 1 2
[30; 35[ - 5 - 2 2 9
[35; 40[ 2 3 - 5 3 13
[40; 45[ 5 17 8 5 5 40
[45; 50[ 6 6 1 5 3 21
[50] 19 4 4 3 1 31
]50; 100] 5 - 1 - - 6
All 37 37 14 20 16
Table 14: Information patterns vs. first-period offers for T4
No Info. Πt pt Πt, pt Other All
[0; 20[ - - - - - 0
[20; 25[ 1 1 - 1 - 3
[25; 30[ - - - - - 0
[30; 35[ 1 3 - 2 1 7
[35; 40[ 1 3 2 1 2 9
[40; 45[ 8 7 4 9 5 33
[45; 50[ 14 4 2 6 4 30
[50] 14 7 5 4 5 35
]50; 100] 3 1 - 2 1 7
All 42 26 13 25 18
Table 15: Information patterns vs. first-period offers for game T5
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B Methodology
B.1 Recruiting
We recruited all participants for our experiments using ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
In addition to the 32 participants we needed for a session, we recruited 5 ad-
ditional persons to ensure we could fill all matching groups. We ensured that
all recruited persons had never participated in ultimatum or bargaining games
before. We made no additional restrictions on the subject pool, i.e., participants
came from different fields of study at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena.
B.2 Used software during sessions
We conducted our experiments in a computerized mode, i.e., we implemented
all games using zTree (Fischbacher (2007)). The zTree files are available upon
request.
Although we handed out instructions20 concerning the game in written form,
we displayed the changes before games T3, T4 and T5 on the participants com-
puter terminals in a one-page PDF using E-nstructions (Schmelz (2011)).
B.3 Structure of one session
Preparation: Before participants entered the laboratory, we started both zTree
on the experimenters’ PC and zLeaf on all client PCs. Afterwards we placed
the instructions for the first game on the seats of each participant.
Admission: In order of arrival, the participants drew 1 out of 32 numbers from
a box. The seats in the laboratory were also numbered from 1 to 32, and each
participant took the seat with the number drawn. After each participant was
assigned a seat, a student assistant sent the remaining persons (who arrived at
the laboratory) home, handing them e2.50 to each.
T2: After admission, the student assistant welcomed all participants to the
laboratory and asked them to read the instructions:21
• “We welcome you to this experiment.” (Orig.: “Herzlich willkommen zu
diesem Experiment.”)
• “Please read the instructions carefully.” (Orig.: “Bitte lesen Sie die An-
leitung gru¨ndlich durch.”)
• “If you have any questions, please raise your hand.” (Orig.: “Sollten Sie
Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand.”)
20See Appendix B.5 for the instructions in German and a translated version
21Instructions and communication were in German. We provide both an English translation
and the original text.
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After all participants had read the instructions, the student assistant sum-
marized them aloud to make them common knowledge.
• “You have all read the instructions for this experiment.” (Orig.: “Sie
haben jetzt alle die Anleitung fu¨r dieses Experiment gelesen.”)
• “I will now briefly summarize the instructions again:” (Orig.: “Ich fasse
die Anleitung noch einmal kurz zusammen:”)
• “The instructions are the same for all of you.” (Orig.: “Die Anleitung ist
fu¨r alle gleich.”)
• “The experiment consists of two periods.” (Orig.: “Das Experiment
besteht aus zwei Runden.”)
• “During each period you are either proposer or responder in alternating or-
der.” (Orig.: “In jeder Runde sind sie abwechselnd entweder Anbietender
oder Nachfrager.”)
• “In each period, the proposer commands an amount he can distribute
between himself and his partner.” (Orig.: “In jeder Runde verfu¨gt der
Anbietende u¨ber einen Betrag, den er zwischen sich und seinem Mitspieler
aufteilen kann.”)
• “The proposer decides how much of this amount he will offer to his part-
ner.” (Orig.: “Der Anbietende entscheidet dann, wie viel er von diesem
Betrag seinem Mitspieler anbietet.”)
• “Then the responder decides whether he accepts the offer.” (Orig.: “Da-
rauf entscheidet der Annehmer, ob er das Angebot annimmt.”)
• “If the responder accepts the offer, the experiment ends and all receive
the amount according to the agreed distribution.” (Orig.: “Nimmt der
Annehmer das Angebot an, endet das Experiment und alle erhalten den
Betrag gema¨ß der abgestimmten Aufteilung.”)
• “If the offer is not accepted, a random draw decides whether the exper-
iment continues. In case of continuation, the next period begins. The
responder from the preceding period is now the proposer and vice versa.
If the experiment ends due to a random draw, both participants receive a
payoff of 0.” (Orig.: “Wird das Angebot nicht angenommen entschei-
det ein Zufallszug, ob das Experiment fortgefu¨hrt wird. Im Fall der
Fortfu¨hrung beginnt die na¨chste Runde. Der Anbieter aus der Vorrunde
ist jetzt der Annehmende und umgekehrt. Endet das Experiment durch
den Zufallszug, so erhalten beide Spieler eine Auszahlung von 0.”)
• “If both participants reach no agreement within two periods, the experi-
ment ends and both participants receive a payoff of 0.” (Orig.: “Kommt es
innerhalb von zwei Runden zu keiner Einigung, so endet das Experiment
auch und beide Teilnehmer erhalten eine Auszahlung von 0.”)
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• “The first period is special: In this period you can ex ante buy infor-
mation concerning the probability that the experiment continues and the
amount to distribute for every period. Every information costs you one
point.” (Orig.: “Die erste Runde hat eine Besonderheit: In dieser Runde
ko¨nnen Sie Informationen bzgl. der Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass das Exper-
iment fortgefu¨hrt wird, und den aufteilenden Betrag fu¨r jede Runde im
voraus erfahren. Jede dieser Informationen kostet Sie einen Punkt.”)
If, after we summarized the instructions, a participant had further questions,
we answered them. Afterwards we started game T3.
T3: After game T2, we displayed the instructions for game T3 on the computer
terminal. After all participants had read the instructions, the student assistant
gave a short summary:
• “You have all read the instructions for the second experiment.” (Orig.:
“Sie haben jetzt alle die Anleitung fu¨r dieses zweite Experiment gelesen.”)
• “I will now briefly summarize the instructions again”: (Orig.: “Ich fasse
die Anleitung noch einmal kurz zusammen:”)
• “Other than the preceding experiment, this experiment ends after a max-
imum of 3 periods.” (Orig.: “Anders als das vorhergehende Experiment
endet dieses Experiment nach maximal 3 Perioden.”)
• “You play with a participant you have not interacted with before. In
addition, the amounts to be distributed and the probabilites for a subse-
quent period may change compared to the preceding experiments.” (Orig.:
“Sie spielen dieses Experiment mit einem Teilnehmer mit dem Sie vorher
noch nicht interagiert haben. Zusa¨tzlich ko¨nnen sich die aufzuteilenden
Betra¨ge und die Wahrscheinlichkeit fu¨r eine Folgeperiode gegenu¨ber den
vorangegangenen Experimenten a¨ndern.”)
If, after summarizing the instructions, a participant had further questions,
we answered them. Afterwards, we started game T4.
T4 and T5: The procedure for games T4 and T5 was identical to the procedure
of T3, except that we instructed participants they were now playing the third
(last) experiment and that the experiment lasted up to 4 (5) periods. When
summarizing the instructions of game T5, we also informed participants that
they would receive their payoffs afterwards.
• “After this experiment, you will receive your payoff.” (Orig.: “Nach
diesem Experiment werden Sie ihre Auszahlung erhalten.”)
Payment: After game T5 we paid all participants. After the payment the
participants left the laboratory.
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B.4 Matching
In the beginning of each session, we assigned all participants to one match-
ing group for the whole session. Each matching group consisted of 8 partici-
pants, and all participants were internally numbered from 1 to 8. This inter-
nal numbering did not change throughout the session and was used to build
(proposer,responder)- pairs. Table 16 summarizes the matching. For example,
the participant internally numbered 1 played with participant 8 in game T2,
with participant 6 in game T3, ...
T2 T3 T4 T5
Prop. Resp. Prop. Resp. Prop. Resp. Prop. Resp.
Pair 1 1 8 6 1 1 4 2 1
Pair 2 7 2 2 5 3 2 4 3
Pair 3 3 6 8 3 5 8 6 5
Pair 4 5 4 4 7 7 6 8 7
Table 16: Matching of participants in one matching group
All participants having odd internal numbers were proposer in games T2 and
T4, all participants having even internal numbers were proposer in games T3 and
T5. In this way, we ensured that no participants had the same role in the first
period of two subsequent experiments.
B.5 Instructions
In this subsection, we print our instructions. We only provide an English trans-
lation to stay within the space limitation. We send the German original to the
interested reader upon request.
B.5.1 English Instructions - First Experiment
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation.
You receive e2.50 for showing up in time. During the experiment you can earn
additional money. Please stay quiet and switch off your mobile phones and
carefully read the instructions - which are the same for all. Communication
between participants is not allowed. If you do not follow these rules, we have
to exclude you from the experiment and any payment. If you have a question,
please raise your hand, an experimenter will then come to you and answer your
question in private.
The amount of e2.50 for showing up in time as well as every additional
amount you earn during the experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end
of the experiment. The payment will be made in private. No other participant
will know the amount of your payment. Your payment depends on your own
decisions and the decisions of other participants. The payment in the experiment
is measured in points. The points you earn during the experiment will be
converted into euro at the end of the experiment and paid to you. The conversion
rate is given at the end of this document. You and all other participants make
their decisions independent of others using a computer terminal.
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Course of the experiment
During each of the total of four experiments you interact with another par-
ticipant which we call your partner. Your partner changes from experiment
to experiment but not during one experiment. With your partner you bargain
during several (at least two) periods over an amount in points. To do so, you
are assigned to one role in the beginning of each period: the proposer or the
responder. If you are proposer in one period, your partner is responder and vice
versa. Depending on your role, you will see different screens.
Course of one period
Figure 2: Offer dialog
In the beginning of one period, the proposer is the first to decide. As proposer
your screen is similar to the screen in Figure 2. On this screen you see the current
period in the upper left area. Below you see all information you know. In the
lower area of the screen, you see a box. Into this box you enter the amount you
want to offer your partner. If your partner accepts the offer, you receive the
amount distributable in this period minus the offer you entered here. After you
entered an amount click “Continue”. You now have to wait for your partner to
decide about acceptance or rejection of your claim.
As responder you have to wait until your partner makes his offer. Then you
see a screen similar to the screen in Figure 3. At the top to the left, you see
the current period. Below you see all the information, you know. In the lower
area of the screen, you see the offer of your partner. You can decide whether
you accept the offer or reject it. If you accept the offer, the experiment ends,
and the proposer is informed of the acceptance.
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Figure 3: Response dialog
If you reject the offer, the experiment continues with a fixed probability p.
In particular, we generate a random number between 0 and 1. If this number
is above p, the experiment ends; otherwise, it continues.
If the experiment continues, you and your partner switch roles, and the next
period of the experiment begins. Except for the changed roles, the rules for this
period are identical to those of the just finished period.
If you and your partner do not reach an agreement until the end of the last
period, both of you receive 0 points.
Specifics of the first period
The first period is different compared to all following periods. In the begin-
ning of the first period, you see an information screen before the normal screens
are shown (see Fig. 4).
This screen consists of one box for every potential period. In the box for
period 1, you see the amount which is distributed in the first period. For all
subsequent periods this box consists of two buttons. By clicking the upper
button, you are informed of the amount to distribute in this period. By clicking
the lower button, you get to know the probability p, with which the experiment
continues in this period if you have not reached an agreement with your partner
before. For each click on a button you face costs of 1 point. You can click
as many buttons as you like. For example, you can click no button, click one
button, ... or click all buttons. As soon as you click one button, you see the
corresponding information. This information is accessible for you in this period
and all subsequent periods. As soon as you have all the information you are
interested in, please click “Continue” to begin bargaining.
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Figure 4: Information at the beginning of the first period
As you need to know the amount to distribute in each period, you are in-
formed of this amount as soon as the corresponding period begins. This also
results in costs of 1 point, as long as you have not bought this information be-
fore. But costs only arise if the corresponding period is reached. In addition,
the amount you and your partner distribute declines from period to period, i.e.,
early agreements are beneficial.
Type and number of experiments
You will participate in four experiments, which all follow the description
above. The experiments only differ in the maximum number of periods, the
amounts to distribute, and the probabilities for one period. The first experiment
lasts for up to 2 periods.
Payment
After the fourth experiment, you are paid. Your payoff is as follows:
+ e2.50 for showing up in time
+ e0.50 to compensate potential losses after buying information
+ Allotment of the distributed amount in the first experiment
− Costs for information in the first experiment
+ Allotment of the distributed amount in the second experiment
− Costs for information in the second experiment
+ Allotment of the distributed amount in the third experiment
− Costs for information in the third experiment
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+ Allotment of the distributed amount in the forth experiment
− Costs for information in the forth experiment
During the experiments costs for information and the distributed amount
are shown in points. For your payoff the points are converted into euro. The
conversion rule is:
1 Point = 0.05 euro
Please consider that it is possible that you and your partner do not reach an
agreement during the experiment. In this case, you may incur a loss by buying
information. To compensate this potential loss, you receive another e0.50.
We round your payoff to the closest amount divisable by e0.10.
B.5.2 English Instructions - Later Experiments
The instructions for game T3 are as follows:
The first experiment is now over. You will start the second experiment in
an instant. It differs from the preceding experiment in the following points:
• The experiment lasts for a maximum of 3 periods.
• The amounts to distribute may change compared to the preceding exper-
iment.
• The probabilities that one period follows another, may change compared
to the preceding experiment.
• For this experiment you are assigned a random new partner you have not
yet interacted with.
The instructions of game T4 (T5) were equivalent to these instructions (ex-
cept for the information that the experiment lasted for 4 (5) periods and that the
participant started the third (forth) experiment. In addition, the instructions
of game T5 were extended by the following hint:
After this experiment you are paid off. Please remain seated until we call
you up for your payment.
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